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Today, unlike in years past, labor is much more likely to be viewed as the victim and not the perpetrator of an
antitrust violation, and there is increasing recognition that firm behavior can negatively affect wages, restrict
worker mobility, and otherwise harm the interests of workers. Pretty much all the labor-related antitrust
litigation of the last 20 years has involved problematic agreements or arrangements among employers, from
which labor deserves protection.
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Today, unlike in years past, labor is much more likely to be viewed as the victim and not the perpetrator 
of an antitrust violation, and there is increasing recognition that firm behavior can negatively affect 
wages, restrict worker mobility, and otherwise harm the interests of workers. Pretty much all the labor-
related antitrust litigation of the last 20 years has involved problematic agreements or arrangements 
among employers, from which labor deserves protection. 
LABOR MARKET MONOPSONY
Wage growth in the U.S. has not kept up with overall economic 
growth. The causes of this wage stagnation are varied and most 
have little or nothing to do with antitrust policy. These include the 
introduction of technologies that reduce labor demand, federal 
and state policies that negatively affect labor unions, outdated 
minimum wage laws, and tax policies that promote investment 
in capital over labor. But, as described in more detail below, there 
are several anticompetitive firm practices that have become more 
prominent and are contributing to labor market “monopsony.” 
Monopsony (a monopoly on the buy-side of the market, rather than 
the sell-side) in labor markets, whereby a small number of compa-
nies dominate hiring, is typically associated with reduced wages. 
Arguably, antitrust law has not been effectively used to combat this 
problem. 
ANTI-POACHING AGREEMENTS
Anti-poaching agreements are arrangements between employers 
to not hire away each other’s workers. Anti-poaching agreements, 
which limit the ability of workers to move around in the job market, 
are a per se violation of antitrust laws and can be a criminal 
offense. For instance, in 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice and 
the state of California filed a lawsuit against eBay, alleging the 
firm participated in a handshake agreement with fellow Silicon 
Valley giant Intuit to refrain from hiring one another’s employees. 
Although eBay publicly insisted that the agreement did not lead 
to anticompetitive effects, it settled the suit in 2014 and assented 
to pay restitution for harm caused to individual workers and the 
California state economy.  
MERGERS AND LABOR MARKET CONCENTRATION
There is robust empirical literature on the relationship between 
labor market concentration—the small number of employers hiring 
in a certain job category—and suppression of wages. Consider, for 
instance, a town where there are only two hospitals that employ 
nurses and compete for their labor. If these two hospitals merge, 
then suddenly, instead of having two employers competing for 
nurses and their skills, there is only one. Wages in such a scenario 
can be expected to go down. New research indicates that, on aver-
age, labor markets are highly concentrated, and the degree of labor 
market concentration tends to be higher in smaller towns and more 
rural areas. As a result, wages tend to be lower in these areas. 
EMPLOYEE NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS 
Employee non-compete agreements prohibit workers from leaving 
one firm and then taking employment at another firm in the same 
industry within a defined geographic range. Historically, non-com-
pete agreements were used sparingly to protect companies from 
“free riding,” whereby companies steal away employees trained at a 
competitor’s expense, as well as loss of intellectual property rights. 
Within the last 20 years, however, there has been more widespread 
use of employee non-compete agreements, and they have been 
migrating down the hiring chain to cover low-skilled employ-
ees, many of whom make around minimum wage. The fast food 
franchise Jimmy John’s, for instance, was forced to stop making its 
low-wage workers sign non-compete agreements in a legal settle-
ment reached with the attorneys general of New York and Illinois.  
Non-compete agreements significantly impair an employee’s mobil-
ity and thus the ability to seek out better wages. 
 OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
Occupational licensing also can have anticompetitive effects. Licensing typically is instituted by professional organizations to help protect 
consumers from harm and preserve the integrity of an industry—as with the requirement of the legal profession that practitioners have a law 
license and that they pass the bar exam. In some instances, though, licensing seems to be nothing more than a mechanism for restricting the 
ability of certain types of workers to enter an industry. For example: On June 17, 2010, the FTC filed a complaint alleging that the North Carolina 
State Board of Dental Examiners (NCBDE) had broken the anticompetitive laws outlined by the Federal Trade Commission Act. Acting upon 
complaints by dentists, the Board had issued cease-and-desist orders to non-dentists offering tooth whitening services and teeth whitening 
products. These orders prompted cosmetologists, self-employed dental hygienists, and other non-dentists to stop offering teeth whitening 
services in North Carolina, thereby reducing market competition. The case went to the Supreme Court and in 2015 the Court ruled 6-3 that 
a Board can invoke state-action antitrust immunity only if it is subject to active supervision by the State, and in the North Carolina case that 
requirement was not met. 
 
CONCLUSION
There is no real closure on any of these labor market issues described above. All are moving targets still, and are statutory—which means that 
Congress can change them to better protect the interests of labor, if it wants.
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Figure 1: Labor Market Concentration by Commuting Zone
This figure depicts labor market concentration, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a standard measure used by antitrust regulators. It shows the average 
HHI by 6-digit Standard Occupational Classification code for the labor markets, between the first quarter of 2010 and the fourth quarter of 2013. HHI is equal to 
the sum of the squares of the market shares of each firm in the market. In the construction of this figure, market shares are based on the share of job vacancies 
posted by all the firms in that labor market, as reflected in data from CareerBuilder.com. The categories used for the HHI concentration levels are as follows—
Low: HHI between 0 and 1500; Moderate: HHI between 1500 and 2500; High: HHI between 2500 and 5000; Very High: HHI between 5000 and 10000. These 
categories correspond to DOJ/FTC guidelines, except that we add the additional distinction between high and very high concentration levels around the 5,000 HHI 
threshold. For more on the measurement of labor market concentration, see https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/issue-brief/v6n3.php.
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